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1 Introduction
In a recent paper, Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013) present a series of
experiments designed to show that the concepts expressed by terms such as artist
and scientist have two independent criteria for categorization, one of which is
inherently normative. They call this unique class of concepts, paradigmatically
expressed by social role terms, ‘dual character concepts’ (DCCs). The study of
DCCs promises to shed light on the nature of our conceptual structures, and has
important implications for topics in social cognition such as normative generics
and gender biases (Leslie, 2015a,b; Reuter and Del Pinal, 2016). In this article,
we present an account of the content and structure of the normative dimension
of DCCs, and test it in a series of experiments.1
To illustrate the basic properties of DCCs consider the following scenarios.
Suppose John has two biological children, whom he materially provides with all
their needs, including food, good schools, and nice toys. However, John does
not think doing so is his duty. He is only a good father because he thinks that
will advance his career as a politician. Is John really a father? In response,
consider whether you agree with (1-a) and (1-b):
(1) a. There is a sense in which John is clearly a father.
b. However, if you think about what it really means to be a father, you
would have to say that John is not a true father after all.
Now, imagine that John’s career foundered and that he abandoned his two kids.
Fortunately, John’s brother, Mark, who has no biological children, decided to
care for the kids. Mark is not as materially successful as John. Sometimes he
can’t provide them with some of their needs. Still, Mark really loves the kids
and works very hard to support them. Is Mark really a father? In response,
consider whether you agree with (2-a) and (2-b):
(2) a. There is a sense in which Mark is clearly not a father.
b. However, if you think about what it really means to be a father, you
would have to say that Mark is a true father after all.
The experiments presented by Knobe et al. (2013) suggest that most of us
would accept (1-a)-(1-b) and (2-a)-(2-b). They also show that this basic pattern
generalizes to other social role terms such as artist, scientist, and friend.
To fully see what is special about DCCs, it is important to note two points.
First, as emphasised by Leslie (2015a), note that the acceptability pattern just
illustrated cannot be explained as a case of standard raising. One might think
1We should clarify at the outset that although—for continuity with previous literature—we
will use the term ‘dual character concepts’ and assume that social role terms express DCCs,
we do not thereby presuppose any position regarding the general conceptual structure of social
role terms, esp., regarding the number of dimensions that they encode. Our only assumption
is that DCCs include, among other dimensions, a normative dimension, and our task here is
to investigate the content and structure of this normative dimension, as it is manifested in
social role concepts. We discuss the general conceptual structure of social roles in the ‘General
Discussion’.
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that John does not count as a true father simply because he fails to meet the
highest standards of fatherhood. However, Mark does count as a true father,
although he is not a normal or standard father. Since in paradigmatic cases
of standard raising—e.g., in perfect athlete—a ‘highly rated x’ is still an x, the
pattern captured by (2-a)-(2-b) suggests a more complex interaction between
linguistic context and the conceptual structure of DCCs. Secondly, social role
terms such as welder, bartender and bus driver obtain lower ratings in cases
parallel to (1-b) and (2-b). In other words, there are di↵erences amongst social
role terms in how naturally they can be accommodated into patterns analogous
to (1-a)-(1-b) and (2-a)-(2-b).
To explain these patterns, Knobe et al. argue that DCCs have a unique
internal structure. As with concepts of other kinds, we can use the concrete
features associated with a DCC to categorise entities and events. What is
distinctive of DCCs, however, is that they also include a normative dimension
that is relevant for categorization. As illustrated in the case of father, the
normative dimension can be dissociated from other concrete features of the
class and used as the sole categorization criterion. In particular, modifiers such
as true in colloquial expressions such as John is not a true father, and real in
expressions such as John is not a real man, seem to operate (not necessarily
exclusively) on this normative dimension. What, precisely, is the content and
structure of this normative dimension?
Knobe et al. (2013) make some important points that bear on this question.
The first is that the normative dimension has to do with abstract values. What
they mean by this is revealed by their examples: for scientist the abstract
value is something like the quest for impartial truth, and for artist something
like creating works of deep aesthetic value. The second is that the normative
dimension of a class must be distinguished from (at least some notions of) its
typical function. For example, while the normative dimension interacts with
modifiers such as true, it does not seem to directly do so with modifiers such
as good, in the sense of ‘useful’ or ‘e cient’. Experiment 1 of Knobe et al.
(2013) shows that most social role terms are equally and highly acceptable
when modified by good, whereas their acceptability varies substantially when
they are modified by true (see the Preliminary Study below).
In an interesting discussion which builds on the results of Knobe et al., Leslie
(2015a) proposes a specific view of the content of the normative dimension, fo-
cusing, as we do here, on the case of social role terms. Leslie agrees that the
normative dimension of DCCs does not represent the usual or even typical func-
tion of the corresponding social roles. For example, the normative dimension of
scientist does not represent superficial functions such as gathering data, look-
ing into microscopes, etc. What is represented is more fundamental: it is more
like an idealisation of the basic function of the role. In the case of scientist,
this would be something like building theories that are responsive to empirical
evidence, among other things. On this view, we can say that a scientist that,
even if in some sense skillfull, completely resists empirical demands to modify
or abandon his theory is not a true scientist because he does not satisfy the
idealised basic function of a scientist.
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Leslie’s proposal can be interpreted in at least two ways. One is to assume
that the normative dimension just represents the idealised basic function. On
this view, the normative dimension of father would directly represent something
like providing for the needs of the family, and that of scientist would represent
something like the search for empirically constrained theories. We will argue
that this is not the best way to implement Leslie’s proposal. It is in tension
with the observation, mentioned above, according to which someone who tries
hard but often fails to fulfill the basic function of a father or scientist can still
count as a true father or scientist. Experiment 1 below confirms this intuition,
namely, that the commitment to fulfill the relevant role is crucial to satisfy
the normative dimension. In addition, both Experiments 1 and 2 show that
skillfully or e ciently fulfilling the basic function is not enough to fully satisfy
the normative dimension.
In our view, a better way to interpret Leslie’s proposal is to hold that,
to satisfy the normative dimension, what matters most is not whether someone
actually fulfills the basic function to some non-trivial degree, but rather whether
someone is committed to fulfill it. Consider again the example of a non-biological
father. From this perspective, what made us agree that Mark is a true father
despite not being a biological father and often failing to fully provide for the
kids, is his sincere and constant commitment to care for them. We should
distinguish, then, between the property of actually fulfilling the basic function
of a social role from that of being committed to fulfill it. The most important
property for satisfying the normative dimension is having the commitment to
the basic function. Experiments 1 and 2 below test this view of the way in which
commitments and basic functions are represented in the normative dimension.
To be clear, our claim is not that evidence that an entity fulfills the basic
function of a DCC does not matter for satisfying its normative dimension. After
all, that someone is a skillful scientist is often a reliable sign that s/he is com-
mitted to being a scientist. Our claim is that being committed to fulfill the basic
function is more important to satisfy the normative dimension of DCCs than
simply being able to fulfill that function. Furthermore, we do not assume that
social role terms are associated with fixed basic functions across all contexts.
Indeed, as shown in Experiment 2, background information can influence which
basic function we associate with a social role. For example, in some contexts, we
can represent artists as aiming to create deep—if disturbing—works of art, while
in other contexts we can represent them as aiming to deliver pleasant aesthetic
experiences. Still, Experiment 2 suggests that, once we fix a particular basic
function for a role, the normative dimension represents that function as the ul-
timate aim of the commitment and not as a means to something else. In other
words, the normative dimension represents commitments to basic functions as
ends in themselves.
The plan for the rest of this paper is as follows. In section 2, we discuss
some terminological issues, introduce the measure we use to study DCCs, and
test its reliability in a preliminary study which we used to validate stimuli for
our experiments. In sections 3-4, we present two experiments which test our
account of the role of commitments in the normative dimension. In section 5,
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we further develop our view, tie it to broader theories of concepts, and defend
its explanatory adequacy by arguing that social role concepts represent com-
mitments because that information is crucial to predict the future social roles
and role-dependent behaviour of others.
2 Preliminary Study
Our study of DCCs focuses on social role terms such as firefighter, bartender,
and scientist. Broadly speaking, these terms pick out professional social roles.
We focus on this class for three reasons. First, we agree with Leslie (2015a)
that social role concepts are the paradigmatic examples of DCCs.2 Second, the
result that most natural kinds are not, in their default readings, DCCs has been
convincingly established by Knobe, Prasada, and Newman (2013). Third, there
are important e↵ects of gender on judgments involving DCCs, which we explore
in follow-up work. To control for this, we excluded gender-based social roles
such as boy and mother.
Turning to the measure of interest, Knobe et al. (2013) argue that one way
to determine whether a term expresses a DCC is to consider its acceptability
under true-modification. By ‘true-modification’ we refer to sentences in which
the predicate is modified by true, as in (3):
(3) Jack is a true scientist.
The basic idea is that, in this kind of linguistic construction, the true-modifier
operates on the normative dimension. Scientist is a paradigmatic DCC, and (3)
seems perfectly acceptable. For terms that arguably have either no normative
dimension or no default value on it, true-modifications will seem less acceptable,
as in (4)-(5):
(4) Jack is a true bus driver.
(5) Jack is a true second cousin.
As (4)-(5) illustrate, not all social role terms are equally acceptable under true-
modification. Whether this means that only some social role terms are really
DCCs—as Knobe et al. (2013) and Leslie (2015a) seem to think—is an issue
that we shall discuss later. For now, let us simply call social role terms which
receive low acceptability ratings in true-modifications ‘weak DCCs’ and those
which receive high ratings ‘strong DCCs’.
Although we distinguish weak and strong DCCs, it is also important to
note that DCCs are sensitive to background information. As Leslie (2015a)
argues, many weak DCCs can be turned, in certain conditions, into strong
DCCs. More precisely: background information (e.g., the discourse context)
2Knobe et al. (2013) show that DCCs are also found in other conceptual domains, e.g.,
amongst some artifact kinds. Still, future studies are needed to determine the degree of
uniformity in the content and structure of the normative dimension of DCCs which otherwise
cut across di↵erent conceptual kinds.
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can increase the acceptability ratings of true-modifications involving social role
terms that, in other conditions, receive low ratings. This suggests that one way
of investigating the content and structure of DCCs is to examine the interaction
between background information and shifts in the acceptability of weak and
strong DCCs in true-modifications. By tracing the parameters in background
information which increase or decrease the acceptability of DCCs, we can test
hypotheses about the content and structure of DCCs. We follow this strategy
in Experiments 1 and 2, which we present in sections 3-4.
Given our strategy for investigating DCCs, we had to verify that accept-
ability ratings of true-modifications reliably order social role concepts such that
some get lower ratings than others. To determine that, we replicated in this
Preliminary study one of the basic results of Knobe et al. (2013), according to
which di↵erent classes of social role concepts obtain reliably di↵erent ratings
under true-modification. All subjects who participated in our experiments were
recruited through Amazon’s Mechanical Turk system for human intelligence
tasks. Each participant was presented with a single question and was sub-
sequently prompted to provide demographical data on age, gender, and native
language. All participants were reimbursed for their participation. We excluded
participants who were not native English speakers, were 17 years or younger,
did not complete the survey, or had already filled out one of our surveys.
2.1 Method
257 participants were recruited for this preliminary study. Each participant
received a single statement of the form Jack is a true artist without any context.
Following Knobe et al.’s measure, participants were then asked to rate how
natural/weird that sentence sounded on a 7-point Likert scale from ‘1’ meaning
‘sounds weird’ to ‘7’ meaning ‘sounds natural’. We used all the professional role
concepts that Knobe et al. classified as either DCCs or controls. Their DCCs
included seven concepts: artist, comedian, minister, musician, scientist, soldier,
and teacher. Their controls included eleven other professional concepts: baker,
bartender, caseworker, cashier, doorman, firefighter, mechanic, optician, tailor,
waiter, and welder. Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the 18
social role concepts.
2.2 Results
We first ran an analysis to determine whether the overall scaling of concepts
according to their acceptability under true-modification was reliable. The anal-
ysis demonstrated high reliability: Spearman Brown’s ⇢ = 976. We then in-
vestigated the di↵erences between DCCs and social role controls. The mean
rating for DCCs (N = 111) was 5.52 (SE = 0.16) and for social role con-
trols (N = 146) was 4.71 (SE = 0.15). An independent t-test was performed,
t(255) = 3.74, p < .001, indicating a highly significant di↵erence between DCCs
and social role controls. The average ratings for each of the concepts are pre-
sented in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. Acceptability-ratings for true-modifications of 18 social role concepts. The concepts
were taken from Knobe et al. (2013). Dark grey columns identify concepts classified as DCCs in
Knobe et al. (2013)’s study. Bars indicate the standard error around the mean.
2.3 Discussion
This Preliminary Study shows that social role concepts can be reliably ordered
in terms of their acceptability ratings under true-modification. In addition, we
replicated a key result of Knobe et al. (2013), according to which the mean
ratings for DCCs such as artist is significantly higher than the mean ratings for
social role controls such as doorman.3 At the same time, if we consider individual
ratings, we see a smooth transition between the acceptability ratings of the
highest and lowest rated DCCs, as illustrated in Figure 1. This suggests that we
should talk instead of strong and weak DCCs. In our subsequent experiments,
we investigated the normative dimension of DCCs by examining how controlled
manipulations of background information a↵ect the acceptability ratings of true-
modifications involving the social role terms presented in this Preliminary Study.
3 Experiment 1
As discussed in the Introduction, our view is that the normative dimension
of a DCC does not directly represent its associated basic function; rather, it
represents that function as the aim of a commitment. According to a natural
competing view, the normative dimension represents the basic functions associ-
ated with social roles in a direct and unmediated way. Aside from some intuitive
3Although our study replicated the basic results of Knobe et al. (2013), some terms did
change from weak to strong DCCs, and vice-versa, as is shown in Figure 1. This di↵erence
might be partly due to the fact that we only used a male protagonist in our stimuli, and we
should briefly explain that choice. In the studies reported in Reuter and Del Pinal (2016), we
found that most of the 18 concepts used by Knobe et al. (2013) are gender-associated (in an
independent test) as either neutral or male. We then show that the gender of the protagonist
has an important e↵ect on the ratings of true-modifications. To control for that e↵ect in the
present studies, we used only male protagonists.
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support, what is the evidence for our view? One might suspect that experiment
2 of Knobe et al. (2013) is relevant. However, their vignettes cannot be used to
address this issue. To see why, consider their vignette for scientist :
George is employed at Ameritech to run experimental studies and
analyse the data. However, he actually has no interest at all in
finding the correct answers to the questions he is studying. So al-
though he goes through the motions, he does not actually care in
any way about making a contribution to people’s understanding of
these issues.
This vignette does not assert that George is a good or skillful scientist; indeed,
it implies quite the opposite. In particular, it seems to exclude the possibility
that George fulfills the idealised basic function of a scientist (‘he has no interest
at all in finding correct answers...’). In general, Knobe et al.’s vignettes do
not suggest that the relevant individuals are good or skillful at their job, hence
they cannot be used to argue for the distinction between the functional and the
normative dimensions of conceptual representation.
To test the hypothesis that what matters for the normative dimension is
not whether someone is skilled or e cient, but rather whether someone is com-
mitted or devoted to the basic function, we presented participants with back-
ground information that asserted either the high-skill or the high-devotion of
protagonists, and compared their e↵ects on the acceptability ratings of true-
modifications. For example, the high-skill condition highlights Jack’s skill as an
artist, while the high-devotion condition highlights Jack’s devotion to being an
artist. If the normative dimension represents unmediated basic functions, then
information of someone’s high skill should provide more direct evidence that the
normative dimension is satisfied compared to information about someone’s com-
mitments. However, if our view is correct, the high-devotion condition should
have a stronger positive impact on the acceptability of true-modifications than
the high-skill condition. For on this view, information about someone’s com-
mitment to the function provides the more direct evidence of satisfaction of the
normative dimension.
3.1 Methods
We used the 18 social role concepts tested in the Preliminary study. To examine
how the high-skill and high-devotion conditions interact with the normative di-
mension, and how ratings in those conditions compare to the no background con-
text (baseline) condition, we randomly assigned 899 participants to either one
of the three conditions: no background context (N=303), high-skill (N=294),
and high-devotion (N=302). The high-skill and high-devotion conditions, which
included strong and weak DCCs, read as follows:
(High-skill) Jack is an artist/doorman. He is very skilled and highly
e cient at his job.
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(High-devotion) Jack is an artist/doorman. He really likes his job and is
completely devoted to it.
After being randomly assigned to one of the 3x18 conditions, participants were
asked to rate whether the corresponding sentence of the form Jack is a true
artist/doorman sounded weird (1), natural (7), or anything in between.
3.2 Results
To understand the analysis and results of Experiment 1, recall that, as shown in
the Preliminary study, DCCs vary substantially in terms of their acceptability
when there is no background information: weak DCCs get low ratings, strong
DCCs get high ratings, and there is gradual progression between the extremes.
For this reason, we have to examine di↵erences in the e↵ect of each background
condition on ratings for weak and for strong DCCs. Our account predicts that
the high-devotion condition should have a stronger positive e↵ect than the high-
skill condition on DCCs whose default rating in the no context condition has
space for improvement. To test this, we used the average ratings of the 18 con-
cepts in the Preliminary study to perform a median split, dividing the concepts
into weak DCCs (caseworker, doorman, cashier, waiter, tailor, teacher, minis-
ter, optician, bartender) and strong DCCs (baker, welder, firefighter, scientist,
artist, mechanic, comedian, musician, soldier). As reported in the Prelimi-
nary Study, the scaling of the concepts in terms of acceptability ratings under
true-modification was highly reliable. Indeed, only a single concept that was
classified as a weak DCC in the Preliminary Study received a rating that placed
it amongst the stronger DCCs in the no context condition of Experiment 1. The
average ratings for weak and strong DCCs in all three conditions of Experiment
1 are shown in Figure 2, and the average values for all individual concepts in each
of the three conditions are presented in Table 1 of the Appendix. We conducted
a nested ANOVA with participants’ ratings as the dependent measure and the
independent factors Context (no context, high-skill, high-devotion), Concept-
type (strong DCCs, weak DCCs), as well as Concept (all 18 social role concepts,
random) nested within Concept-type. A highly significant interaction occurred
between Context and Concept-type, F (2, 845) = 9.71, p < 0.001. Crucially, for
weak DCCs, the high-devotion condition significantly increased their average
rating from 4.30 (in the no context condition) to 5.09, whereas the high-skill
condition non-significantly increased their average ratings to 4.50. This result
confirms our prediction. For strong DCCs, which are close to ceiling in the no
context condition, the high-devotion condition had no e↵ect, and the high-skill
condition decreased their ratings from 5.74 to 4.97.
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Figure 2. Acceptability-ratings for strong and weak DCCs in the no-context, high-skill, and
high-devotion conditions. Bars indicate the standard error around the mean.
Our account also predicts a main e↵ect of Context such that the high-
devotion condition should have a stronger e↵ect on the average acceptability of
true-modifications compared to the high-skill condition. The analysis revealed
a significant main e↵ects for Context, F (2, 845) = 16.71, p < 0.001. Averaging
over the 18 social role concepts, the high-devotion condition raised the mean
value from 5.01(SE = 0.10) to 5.39(SE = 0.09), whereas the high-skill condi-
tion dropped the value to 4.74(SE = 0.10). Posthoc tests revealed a significant
di↵erence between the high-devotion and the high-skill conditions (p < 0.001),
as well as between the high-devotion and the no-context conditions (p = 0.017),
whereas no significant e↵ect was found between the high-skill and the no-context
conditions (p = 0.124). A significant main e↵ect was found for Concept-type,
F (1, 845) = 27.21, p < 0.001, which is expected given the basis for the classifi-
cation of concepts into weak and strong DCCs. The analysis also revealed a sig-
nificant main e↵ect for the nested factor Concept, F (16, 845) = 2.86, p = 0.005,
indicating that there is substantial variation in the true-ratings amongst the in-
dividual concepts classified as weak and strong DCCs. No interaction occurred
between Context and the nested factor Concept, F (32, 845) = 0.71, p = 0.885.
As shown in Figure 3, we created two scatterplots with data from the no-
context condition on the x-axis, and the results from the high-devotion and
high-skill conditions on the y-axis, and fitted the data points using linear mod-
els. The fitted lines demonstrate that progressively higher ratings in the no-
context condition correspond with progressively higher ratings in the high-skill
and high-devotion conditions. This indicates that participants processed the
information in each condition as intended: specifically, they do not just process
the information provided by the background context, but also that provided by
the specific social roles. Importantly, Figure 3 also shows that, for almost every
concept, the average ratings in the high-devotion condition are greater than in
the high-skill condition. This reveals that the main e↵ect of Context reported in
the ANOVA is not driven by a special subset of the concepts, since there is high
consistency in the ratings for the 18 concepts across both context conditions.
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Figure 3. Scatterplot for all concepts. Triangles indicate the rating of each concept in the
high-devotion condition and circles indicate the rating in the high-skill condition.
3.3 Discussion
Experiment 1 examines how background information regarding the level of skill
or commitment of protagonists a↵ects the ratings of true-modifications involv-
ing DCCs. According to our view, which says that the normative dimension
represents basic functions as the objects of commitments, information of the
protagonist’s high commitment or devotion should have a significantly stronger
positive e↵ect on the ratings. This e↵ect should be most clearly observed in the
case of weak DCCs, since these concepts obtain relatively weak ratings when
there is no background information.
Confirming this prediction, the most general result of Experiment 1 is that,
compared to a control condition with no background information, informa-
tion of high devotion significantly increased the overall acceptability of true-
modifications. In contrast, information of high skill and e ciency in fulfilling
the roles did not increase the overall acceptability of the corresponding true-
modifications. This pattern of results directly supports the hypothesis that the
normative dimension of DCCs represents commitments to fulfill the relevant
basic functions. This view is further reinforced by the fine-grained analysis
which looked into the e↵ects of the high devotion vs. the high skill conditions
on the ratings of true-modifications for strong vs. weak DCCs. Strong DCCs
such as scientist and artist already obtain high acceptability ratings under true-
modification in the no-context condition, as shown in the Preliminary Study and
further confirmed in the no context condition of Experiment 1. Since the ratings
of strong DCCs are at or close to ceiling, there is little scope to observe the pre-
dicted positive e↵ect of information of high-devotion. In contrast, weak DCCs
such as doorman and cashier obtained relatively low ratings in the no context
condition, hence can be used to observe the e↵ects on the ratings of additional
information about the high devotion or skill of protagonists. As predicted by
our hypothesis, the high devotion condition had a significant positive e↵ect on
the acceptability ratings of weak DCCs, whereas the high skill condition did not
significantly increase their acceptability.
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As we just said, strong DCCs obtain high default ratings in the no context
condition, and for this reason are not directly useful in terms of testing the
competing accounts of the normative dimension. It is unsurprising, then, that
the high devotion condition had no e↵ect on the ratings of strong DCCs. How-
ever, the high-skill condition had a negative e↵ect on the acceptability ratings
of strong DCCs, which resulted in an interaction between Concept-type and
Context. This negative e↵ect is not predicted by the accounts of the normative
dimension considered here, and seems to require an independent explanation.
One possibility—compatible with our account—is that the drop is due to a
pragmatic e↵ect. Specifically, saying that Jack is a skilled artist can be taken as
suggesting that he is at most only a skilled artist, hence that he lacks something
which is relevant to his being a true artist.4
To sum up, Experiment 1 shows that, for DCCs whose default ratings
have scope for improvement, including weak DCCs, information of the pro-
tagonist’s high-devotion has a significant positive e↵ect on the acceptability of
true-modifications. In contrast, information of the protagonist’s high-skill has
no significant positive e↵ect on the acceptability of true-modifications. This pat-
tern of results support the hypothesis that the normative dimension of DCCs
represents the commitments to fulfill the basic function of the corresponding
social roles, and not just the unmediated basic functions by themselves.
4 Experiment 2
Experiment 1 supports the view that the normative dimension of DCCs in-
volves the representation of commitments. Now, commitments in general, and
their representations in particular, have structure, i.e., they are commitments
to something. We argued that the normative dimension of DCCs represents
commitments as aiming to fulfil the basic function of the corresponding social
role. However, Experiment 1 does not tell us much about the aims of these
commitments. For example, maybe it matters for being a true artist that Jack
tries to produce works of aesthetic value, but it is irrelevant whether he does
so because that is the ultimate aim of his commitments qua artist, or because
he believes that is a means to become rich or famous. The question, then, is
whether DCCs represent commitments to their basic functions as ends in them-
selves, as we hold, or whether they can also be commitments to other ultimate
aims, such as fulfilling the role as a means to get money or fame.
4Another possibility is that, when presented with a high-skill condition, participants ignore
the content of the social role term, and focus on the relation between the context and the
modifier true. As a result, we observe, relative to the no context condition, a drop in the
ratings for strong DCCs and an increase for weak DCCs. The problem with this suggestion is
that there is no principled reason why it shouldn’t also apply to the high-devotion condition.
The ratings for the high-skill condition should be roughly the same across weak and strong
DCCs, and similarly the ratings for the high-devotion condition should be roughly the same
across weak and strong DCCs. However, this is not what we observe: the ratings of DCCs
in the high-skill and high-devotion conditions are significantly positively correlated with the
ratings in the no-context condition (see Figure 3).
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In addition, we have presented our view as if each social role term is asso-
ciated with a fixed basic function. This is a substantial simplification. Indeed,
any plausible view of DCCs must be compatible with the well-known fact that
the concepts expressed by particular words can vary depending on the discourse
context, among other things (Roth and Shoben, 1983; Barsalou, 1987; Rosch,
2011). In particular, we expect that the basic functions associated with social
role terms can, to some extent, vary in response to background information.
We might have a default concept associated with artist, but we often use this
term to talk about more specific or even idiosyncratic subclasses: e.g., it can
express a concept closer to that of a composer, a painter, or a performer, and
its associated function can vary accordingly.
The relative context-sensitivity of social role terms provides us with a way
to test our hypothesis regarding the way in which the normative dimension of
DCCs represents commitments. If our view is correct, once a function is asso-
ciated with a DCC on a particular occasion, the commitment to that function
is represented as an end in itself. The alternative view is that simply having
commitments matter, regardless of what their ultimate aim is—so long as the
role and its function is a reasonable way to achieve that ultimate aim. To test
these hypotheses, we provided participants with vignettes that vary two param-
eters: the basic function that Jack performs as a member of certain social roles,
and the ultimate aim of Jack’s commitment qua member of that role. In some
vignettes, the function is the ultimate aim of the commitment, and in others the
function is only a means to some other ultimate aim, as in the example of the
artist who creates art to get money or fame. If our hypothesis is correct, cases
in which the function is the ultimate aim of the commitment should result in
higher acceptability ratings of the corresponding true-modifications compared
to cases in which the function is only a means to some other end.
4.1 Methods
811 participants were recruited for Experiment 2. We created vignettes in which
we varied both the basic Function of the protagonist’s social role (Default func-
tion, Preference, Output), and the ultimate Aim of his role (End in itself,Money,
Fame). To illustrate, here is the example for artist :
Jack is an artist. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to produce
a. works of art that inspire other people. [Default function]
b. works of art that he likes. [Preference]
c. as many works of art as possible. [Output ]
He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of an artist. [End in itself ]
(ii) those works of art will earn him a lot of money. [Money ]
(iii) those works of art will make him famous. [Fame]
Participants were presented with a vignette obtained by matching one of the
Functions in (a)-(c) with one of the Aims in (i)-(iii), and were then asked
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to rate whether the sentence Jack is a true artist sounded weird (1), natural
(7), or anything in between. Note that the vignettes that involved the aim
End in itself—i.e., a-(i), b-(i), c-(i)—were the conditions in which the ultimate
aim of the commitment is the basic function. The other vignettes were the
conditions in which the ultimate aim is something else, namely, Money or Fame.
To ensure the comparability of the responses, our vignettes only varied the
parameters Function and Aim. These vignettes could be coherently applied
to six professional roles: artist, baker, comedian, musician, scientist, tailor,
all of which share the feature of producing identifiable social goods, and of
being reasonable means to get money or fame. Each participant was randomly
presented with one of the 3 x 3 x 6 conditions. The full set of vignettes is
presented in the Appendix.
4.2 Results
Figure 3 below depicts the mean values for the nine conditions averaged over all
six DCCs. We performed a 3 x 3 x 6 ANOVA with Aim (end-in-itself, money,
fame), Function (default, preference, output), and Concept (artist, baker, co-
median, musician, scientist, tailor) as independent factors, and participant’s
rating as the dependent measure. The data exhibited significant main e↵ects
for Aim, F (2, 757) = 23.57, p < 0.001, for Function, F (2, 757) = 4.16, p = 0.016,
as well as for Concept, F (5, 757) = 4.49, p < 0.001. The overall average
ratings for each of the three Aims were 5.39(SE = 0.11) for end-in-itself,
4.59(SE = 0.11) for money, and 4.58(SE = 0.10) for fame. Posthoc tests
for Aim revealed highly significant (p < 0.001) di↵erences between end-in-itself
and money, as well as between end-in-itself and fame, but not between money
and fame (p = 1.000). Posthoc tests for Function showed a significant di↵er-
ence between default function and output (p = 0.008), but not between de-
fault function and preference (p = 0.135), or between output and preference
(p = 0.937). No significant interaction occurred between Aim and Function,
F (4, 757) = 0.66, p = 0.616. To investigate the internal consistency across con-
cepts, we determined possible interactions between Aim andConcept, and Func-
tion and Concept. While no significant interaction was found between Aim and
Concept, F (10, 757) = 1.58, p = 0.108, a significant interaction was observed
between Function and Concept, F (10, 757) = 2.87, p = 0.002.
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Figure 3. Comparison of average ratings for three di↵erent basic functions—default function,
preference, output—when that function is described as being the ultimate aim of the commitment
(end in itself), or as being a means to something else (money, fame). Bars indicate the standard
error around the mean.
4.3 Discussion
Experiment 2 explores the relation between the basic function of social role
terms and the structure of commitments as represented in the normative di-
mension. In our view, the normative dimension of DCCs has a fixed, ‘end in
itself’ structure: the basic function of the DCC is the ultimate aim of the com-
mitment. According to the competing view, the normative dimension can have
a means-end structure: the aims of the commitments allow for the basic func-
tion of the DCC to be the means to some other end. Experiment 2 obtained
three main results which, taken together, strongly support our view.
The first result is that participants are relatively flexible in the type of basic
function that they can associate with particular social roles. The main function
associated with an artist can be to produce works that the artist thinks others
will find inspiring, or simply works that he likes. Now, we are not suggesting
that anything goes. For example, assigning an artist the basic function of buying
art would be bizarre and likely unacceptable to most participants. Indeed, our
results show that, for most concepts, the basic default function had a stronger
positive e↵ect on the ratings compared to both output or preference. However,
the acceptability pattern for all three functions varies considerably across the six
social role concepts. For example, while output (producing lots of theories) had
the lowest rating for true-scientist, output (e cient tailoring) had the highest
rating for true-tailor. Taken on its own, this result is consistent with both views
under discussion.
The second result is that, given any of the three kinds of basic functions for
a social role, participants are more willing to accept the corresponding true-
modification whenever the ultimate aim of the commitment is simply to fulfill
that social role’s function. In particular, if Jack’s aim in performing the role
of an artist is, ultimately, to acquire money or fame, then the ratings of the
corresponding true-modification drop significantly. The general result is clearly
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illustrated in Figure 3. Independently of which type of basic function is selected
(default, output, or preference), the Aim that always gets the highest ratings is
end-in-itself, i.e., the condition in which the ultimate aim of the commitment is
to fulfill the role’s function. This result was significant and consistent across all
six social role concepts, hence clearly supports our claim regarding the ‘end in
itself’ structure of the normative dimension. In addition, it is in tension with the
alternative view which allows commitments to basic functions to be represented
as means to some other end, such as making money or seeking fame.
The third key result is that there is no interaction between the type of basic
Function and Aim. This suggests that, regardless of the type of function which
we associate with a social role (default, output, or preference), the structure
of the commitment, as represented in the normative dimension, is fixed as an
end in itself commitment to the role’s basic function. On the competing view,
the ultimate aim of the commitment could be to fulfill the basic function as a
means to make money or pursue fame. We saw that this view is not supported
by the second result. Still, we can imagine a variant that says that the structure
of commitments can vary depending on the type of function of the DCC. For
example, if the basic function of artist is to inspire people, then the ultimate aim
of the commitment is to that function, but if the function is productivity, then
the ultimate aim could reasonably be to make money or seek fame. Crucially,
however, this view does not cohere with the result that no interaction was found
between type of function and the way in which commitments are represented.
The representation of commitments seems to have a fixed, end in itself structure:
what matters for satisfying the normative dimension of a social role concept is
an ultimate commitment to the role’s function.
5 General Discussion
Experiments 1 and 2 provide us with key insights into the content and structure
of the normative dimension of the DCCs expressed by social role terms. We
have argued that the normative dimension represents commitments to the basic
function associated with the relevant social roles. We have also argued that
such commitments are represented in a relatively constrained way, namely, as
ends in themselves. To further develop and refine this view, we now briefly
address three important general questions. (i) How should we integrate our
account of DCCs into broader accounts of the structure of lexical concepts? (ii)
How do the normative and other dimensions of DCCs interact with linguistic
modifiers and non-linguistic background knowledge? (iii) Is our theory of the
normative dimension explanatorily adequate? In other words, why should social
role concepts include a normative dimension that represents commitments to
basic functions?
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5.1 Conceptual structure of DCCs
A key task in the study of DCCs is to determine how best to fit them into
broader theories of lexical concepts (Knobe et al., 2013). One suggestion is that
DCCs are a subclass of essentialist concepts alongside natural kinds. According
to essentialists, we posses ‘folk theories’ in which essences are not only what
define certain categories but are also causally responsible for their concrete or
typical features (Keil, 1989; Gelman and Wellman, 1991).5 Although the rela-
tion between the normative dimension and the concrete features of DCCs is one
of ‘realization’ rather than ‘causation’, one could adopt an analogous view ac-
cording to which we also have ‘normative folk theories’. The concrete features of
DCCs are then unified as being those features that, according to our normative
theories, typically manifest the corresponding commitments represented in their
normative dimension. On this view, although we often use concrete features to
categorize entities as DCCs, we understand that the deeper, independent, and
final criterion of membership is the abstract value.
Although we share the intuition that the normative dimension is a central
dimension of DCCs, we doubt that it is akin to an essence. Experiment 2 of
Knobe et al.’s study shows that there is a key di↵erence between the role of
the essence in categorization with natural kinds and the role of the normative
dimension in categorization with DCCs. As illustrated by (1-a) and (1-b) above,
someone can fail to satisfy the normative dimension but still fall under a DCC;
but the analogous pattern does not hold for natural kinds, the paradigmatic
examples of essentialist concepts. Imagine an animal that looks and hunts like
a tiger, but gives birth to pumas and has puma DNA. Consider (6-a) and (6-b):
(6) a. There is a sense in which that animal is clearly a tiger.
b. However, if you think about what it really means to be a tiger, you
would have to say that it is not really a tiger.
To most people, (6-b) will seem fine, but (6-a) will seem unacceptable. Exper-
iment 2 of Knobe et al. (2013) confirms this intuition. Essentialist accounts
have a good explanation for this response pattern, since they hold that the real
criterion for membership in a natural kind is satisfaction of the essence. In this
case, there is direct evidence that the animal does not have the tiger essence;
so despite being superficially like one, there is no sense in which it is a tiger.6
5In this discussion of the ‘essentialist’ theory of concepts, we focus on a traditional version of
the theory. In an instructive discussion, Strevens (2000) distinguishes between three versions
of essentialism: pure, internal and statistical essentialism. Pure and internal essentialists
assume that the core is what defines categories in the sense that satisfaction of the core is
necessary and su cient for membership. Strevens argues that traditional essentialists such
as Keil (1989) and Gelman and Wellman (1991) are pure or internal essentialist. This is the
version of the essentialism we will explicitly reject when extended to DCCs.
6For interesting empirical investigations of di↵erences in the features, dimensions, and the
way in which they are integrated in categorization under natural kinds compared to artifact
kinds, see Hampton et al. (2007) and Hampton et al. (2009). For our purposes, we are only
pointing out the observed contrast between DCCs and natural kinds in cases analogous to
(6-a)-(6-b). We are not endorsing a traditional essentialist theory for natural kinds, which the
studies just mentioned show would require some substantial reformulation.
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The normative dimension of DCCs, then, behaves more like a central but
defeasible dimension than like an essence in a natural kind. To say that a
dimension or feature d is central in a concept C is to say that other dimensions
and features of C depend on d more than it depends on them. However, to
say that, despite its centrality, d is not an essence is to say that, if a su cient
number of other features are satisfied, something can be a C despite not falling
under d. One way to capture this suggestion is to adopt a version of prototype
theory that organizes features not only into sets of weighted dimensions, but
also encodes the dependency relations amongst those dimensions (Sloman et al.,
1998). Hampton (2006) calls these structures ‘theory-based prototypes’. To be
clear, neither Experiments 1-2, nor any of the experiments presented by Knobe
et al. (2013), provide the data we need to determine, with precision, the relative
centrality of the normative dimension in the conceptual structure of DCCs. We
focus on this issue in future work.7
5.2 DCCs in context
To sketch how DCCs interact with linguistic modifiers, consider first some gen-
eral properties of their conceptual structure. Take the lexical entry for scien-
tist. Based on what we said so far, this entry includes, at least, the follow-
ing dimensions: perceptual (how scientists look), functional (functiond/c
of scientists), and normative (commitment to fulfill the functiond/c of scien-
tists). The subscript ‘d/c’ in ‘function’ captures part of the structural constraint
which we established in Experiment 2. Terms like scientist have a default basic
functiond, which can change to a contextually relevant basic functionc. When
that happens, the aim of the commitment changes from functiond to functionc,
but, crucially, it continues to be represented as an end in itself. The DCCs
which represent social roles likely include other dimensions (Pustejovsky, 1995;
Del Pinal, 2015), which for simplicity we ignore here.8
As we mentioned above, we assume that conceptual representations can en-
code the relative weights of, and the dependency relations between, features and
7One could hold that social role terms might be ambiguous and express a descriptive social
role concept in one sense and a purely normative concept in another. We empirically address
this worry in our studies of centrality: if it turns out that the normative dimension is central
to social role terms (as indeed our initial results suggest), this would support the view that it
is a dimension in a unified conceptual structure used to represent social roles. For theoretical
reasons to hold that these dimensions are most useful if unified, see §5.3 below.
8Some philosophers would argue that those features or dimensions which are not necessary
for determining the reference or extension of concepts or terms should not, strictly speaking,
be taken as part of their conceptual structure. From this perspective, most empirical studies
of conceptual structure, such as those found in Knobe et al. (2013) and the studies presented
above, are really studies about our ‘conceptions’ of classes (cf. Burge, 1993). Our account
should still be of interest to those philosophers, at least if they also agree that it is important
to understand how we ‘conceive’ of social roles. Still, it is crucial to note that, as we will
explain below, the compositional behaviour of social roles does seem to depend on linguistic
operations having access to such ‘conceptions’. If this is correct, conceptions will do some of
the job that concepts traditionally are thought to do. For a detailed defence of this view, see
Del Pinal (2015).
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dimensions (Sloman et al., 1998; Hampton, 2006; Hampton et al., 2009). Focus-
ing on the weights and membership thresholds of DCCs, we have seen that, for
most DCCs, someone can count as a member by satisfying the normative, but
also by satisfying the functional.9 Furthermore, although either dimension
might be su cient, neither one seems to be necessary for membership. At the
same time, it seems clear that someone cannot be, say, a scientist if s/he satisfies
the perceptual, but neither the normative nor the functional.
Now, conceptual structures can be modified by linguistic operators. In the
framework we adopted, a natural way of modelling these e↵ects is as follows.
Modifiers such as e cient and true take conceptual structures as inputs and
change them in certain systematic ways (cf. Smith et al. 1988; Hampton 1995).
An e cient scientist is e cient at producing experiments and theories. A true
scientist is someone who is committed to the aims of science. In general, the
e↵ect of each modifier is to change the membership threshold, centrality rela-
tions and weights of the dimensions of the modified noun. For example, e cient
increases the relative weight of the functional so that it becomes necessary
to pass the threshold, and true increases the relative weight of the normative
so that it becomes necessary to pass the threshold.
Other modifiers can be treated in a similar way. One interesting modifier,
extensively discussed in Leslie (2015a), is real as used in expressions such as
John and Mark are painters; but only John is a real artist. Leslie points out
that real and true both operate on the normative dimension. There might,
however, be a subtle di↵erence. True increases the relative weight of the nor-
mative, so there are cases in which someone can be an amateur scientist but
still be a true scientist, if his commitments are in the right place. In the case
of real, both dimensions seem to be crucial, i.e., to be a real scientist both the
normative and the functional have to be satisfied. Finally, the use of lin-
guistic modifiers is not necessary to perform these changes in the structure of
DCCs; as Leslie emphasises in her discussion of slurs such as Hillary Clinton is
the only man in the Obama Administration, non-linguistic information can also
a↵ect the structure of social role concepts in analogous ways.
5.3 Why do social role concepts have a normative dimen-
sion?
We argued that the concepts expressed by many social role terms have a norma-
tive dimension which represents commitments to basic functions. Insofar as our
account coheres with the available data, we can say that it is descriptively ade-
quate. At the same time, one might inquire as to the explanatory adequacy of
this account. Why should there be a normative dimension, so conceived, in the
conceptual structure of DCCs at all? In particular, why should social roles, but
9To illustrate, recall the initial example involving John, the biological and successful father,
and Mark, the non-biological and committed father. Those examples suggest that most people
are willing to call someone a father, as long as he satisfies at least one of the functional or
the normative.
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not other types of concepts, have a dimension involving commitments? To meet
the demands of explanatory adequacy, we must address these sorts of questions.
The structure and information encoded in concepts, most cognitive scientists
would agree, is largely determined by two factors (Rosch, 1999). (i) Our con-
ceptual system aims to provide maximum information about the environment
with the least cognitive e↵ort, and in particular to predict as many properties
as possible from knowing any one property. (ii) We perceive properties in the
world as having high-correlational structure. If we apply these principles to
the human social world, we can begin to see why, in that domain, representing
commitments turns out to be useful.
Suppose you want to predict the behaviour of objects y and z. If you learn
that y is a gold ring and z is a bee, you can make many predictions: e.g., that you
can grab y but should leave z alone, and that neither one is as tasty as an apple.
The behaviour of the bee is more complex, and requires some form of means-
ends reasoning. For everyday purposes, the set of basic goals which we use to
interact with a random bee derive from their kind and the local environment.
For more refined purposes, we can subdivide into worker bees, queen bees, etc.,
which will determine a more refined set of functions. Still, even in these cases
there is no use in representing bees in terms of their ‘commitments’.
However, once we add highly flexible social entities such as humans unto
the perceived environment, we add an important layer of complexity. Human
behaviour is radically unpredictable from the sorts of general biological facts we
use to understand other animals. To predict much of human behaviour in any
useful way, one needs to know more than just their biological properties and
relevant environmental facts. In particular, one needs to know their social roles
and corresponding functions. Furthermore, one key property of many social
roles is that, in certain conditions, they are voluntary. Since a random Jack
can choose to be an artist or scientist, and since Jack can also choose to change
roles, it is particularly useful to categorize Jack in terms of his commitments.
Given these basic properties of human behaviour, information about the
relevant commitments is fundamental to make useful categorizations and pre-
dictions. In particular, it is useful to know not only whether Jack is good or
bad at something, but also whether he is committed to it. Suppose you know
that Jack is a really good pianist. Will he become a professional pianist? Hard
to say. Suppose that you know, in addition, that Jack is committed to being
a pianist. Then predicting his future behaviour is easier. Suppose that John
is not, at the moment, a good pianist. Will he become a professional pianist?
Probably not, but still hard to say. Suppose you then find out that he is com-
mitted to being a pianist. You can predict, with some confidence, that he will
keep on playing, despite currently being quite bad at it.
Almost everyone is, at some point in their development, quite bad at per-
forming the functions of their future social roles. However, whether they will
eventually perform those functions, whether they will become good at them, and
if good, whether they will continue those activities, depends to a large extent on
their commitments. So the information encoded in the functional and in the
normative allows us to make predictions about how someone will behave in
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certain conditions, and there are contexts in which one or the other dimension is
more useful. Hence, despite the high-level talk of ‘abstract values’ and ‘norma-
tive dimensions’, there is nothing mysterious about why, given the basic function
of categorisation and the kind of flexibility inherent to human behaviour, many
of our social role concepts should include a dimension that encodes the relevant
commitments. Without access to this dimension, our predictions regarding the
behavior of others would be substantially impoverished.
This explanation of the usefulness of representing commitments in our con-
cepts of social roles naturally accommodates the finding that there are weak
and strong DCCs (see the Preliminary Study above). In our view, DCCs cap-
ture the basic structure of the perceived human social world, including sets
of co-occurring features. Now, most people believe that gaining and/or keep-
ing membership in some social roles requires a greater degree of commitment
and e↵ort than gaining and/or keeping membership in others. Our social role
concepts seem to encode these di↵erences. If we compare paradigmatic weak
DCCs (e.g., doorman, cashier) with strong DCCs (e.g., scientist, musician), we
can see that they likely reflect some common cultural evaluations along these
lines. Crucially, those default assumptions can be reconfigured when the level
of commitment of particular members is made explicit (see Experiment 1).
This explanation also sheds light on why the normative seems to represent
commitments to basic functions as ends in themselves, and not as means to other
ends (see Experiment 2). Representing commitments helps us predict whether,
say, Jack will become a pianist. To e ciently achieve that, the concept of a
pianist directs our attention to information about the extent to which Jack is
committed to being a pianist for its own sake, rather than as a means to make
money or become famous. If Jack is already a pianist, assertions that Jack is
a true pianist provide us with information about Jack’s ultimate commitment
to the basic function of a pianist. This information is crucial to predict Jack’s
likelihood to continue in that role, especially when certain externalities change
its e↵ectiveness as a means to other ends. The underlying bet of our conceptual
system seems to be that, overall, an important predictor of someone’s eventual
or continual membership in a social role is the level of her/his commitment to
that role’s basic function as an end in itself.
To be clear, our claim is not that information about, say, Jack’s commitment
to a role is more important, in some absolute sense, than information about his
skill at that role, for prediction and counterfactual thought. Our claim is rather
that both are important, but their respective usefulness is crucially di↵erent.
This is easy to see in cases of counterfactual reasoning. Suppose Jack is a
very skilled doctor, and imagine that he is suddenly o↵ered another job, which
pays much more. What will Jack do? In this kind of scenario, information
about Jack’s level of commitment to being a doctor becomes highly relevant.
Clearly, we often have to predict the decisions of others in structurally similar
scenarios. Overall, these considerations suggest that our account of the content
and structure of the normative dimension has the resources to meet the demands
of explanatory adequacy.
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5.4 Future directions
The empirical study of social role concepts and DCCs is in its infancy. To con-
clude, we briefly three promising areas for future research. First, it is reasonable
to think that there are limits to what we intuitively accept as reasonable ends
that beings like us can be genuinely committed to. Indeed, there are many
social roles, di↵erent from the ones we examined here, whose basic function car-
ries a negative connotation. In many of these cases, modification by true feels
strange or inappropriate: e.g., consider true prisoner and true money launderer.
An intriguing question is to explore the ways in which moral values and other
normative considerations a↵ect what we consider possible ends that individuals
could be freely committed to. Second, when considering the general structure
of social role concepts, how central, compared to other dimensions, is the nor-
mative? We have argued that the normative is unlikely to be as central for
social roles as the essence is for natural kinds. Furthermore, the answer to this
question could depend on the subclass of social roles being considered. Still,
it is important to determine the relative centrality of the functional and the
normative for each natural subclass of social role concepts. The third and final
issue we want to mention is the following. Assuming we are correct about the
role of commitments in our representations of social roles, what are the impli-
cations for more general issues in social cognition, including the study of gender
and other biases? We show in Reuter and Del Pinal (2016) that varying the
gender of the protagonist a↵ects the ratings of true-modifications. Examining
these sorts of e↵ects might shed light on implicit assumptions regarding gender,
commitments, and social roles. At this point, we hope to have shown, in the
spirit of Knobe et al. (2013) and Leslie (2015a), that the detailed empirical and
theoretical study of social role concepts promises to provide key insights into
the nature of social cognition.
Appendix
A.1 Tables
Table 1. Average ratings for all 18 concepts in the three conditions used in Experiment 1,
including di↵erence scores between the high-devotion/high-skill condition and the no background
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condition.
A.2 Vignettes used in Experiment 2
In Experiment 2, we obtained vignettes for each term by matching each of (a), (b),
and (c) with each of (i), (ii), and (iii). Participants were randomly assigned to one of
the 3 x 3 x 6 conditions. The full scheme for the vignettes are the following:
Artist
Jack is an artist. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to produce
a. works of art that inspire other people.
b. works of art that he likes.
c. as many works of art as possible.
He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of an artist.
(ii) those works of art will earn him a lot of money.
(iii) those works of art will make him famous.
Baker
Jack is a baker. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to bake
a. cakes that people find delicious.
b. cakes that he likes.
c. as many cakes as possible.
He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of a baker.
(ii) those cakes will earn him a lot of money.
(iii) those cakes will make him famous.
Comedian
Jack is a comedian. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to produce
a. jokes that make people laugh.
b. jokes that he likes.
c. as many jokes as possible.
He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of a comedian.
(ii) those jokes will earn him a lot of money.
(iii) those jokes will make him famous.
Musician
Jack is a musician. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to compose
a. songs that captivate other people.
b. songs that he likes.
c. as many songs as possible.
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He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of a musician.
(ii) those songs will earn him a lot of money.
(iii) those songs will make him famous.
Scientist
Jack is a scientist. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to construct
a. theories that expand human knowledge.
b. theories that he likes.
c. as many theories as possible.
He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of scientist.
(ii) those theories will earn him a lot of money.
(iii) those theories will make him famous.
Tailor
Jack is an tailor. He is talented and very skilled. Jack tries to tailor
a. costumes that suit his clients.
b. costumes that he likes.
c. as many costumes as possible.
He aims to do so because he believes that
(i) this is the purpose of a tailor.
(ii) those costumes will earn him a lot of money.
(iii) those costumes will make him famous.
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